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Abstract 
The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) was launched in 2008 to provide inpatient insurance 
coverage to all below-poverty-line (BPL) households in India. Using household level panel data from 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar (2012-2013), this paper investigates the determinants of enrolling and 
dropping-out of the scheme. We next investigate whether participation is positively associated with 
inpatient-care utilization and financial protection. We find that the presence of chronic illnesses, 
lower socioeconomic status, belonging to scheduled-castes or tribes (SCST), insurance related 
awareness and proximity to healthcare facilities are positively correlated with enrolment. SCST status 
and presence of chronic condition households deter households from dropping-out. The 
associations between RSBY membership and healthcare use and financial protection vary across the 
states. Unlike UP, we only find insured households in Bihar to experience lower out-of-pocket 
payments and debt following hospitalization. Overall, we conclude that though the RSBY does 
appear to be pro-poor and is inclusive of disadvantaged minorities, the scheme suffers from adverse 
selection. The RSBY has the potential to play an important role in India’s move towards Universal 
Health Coverage. To do this however, scheme awareness should be increased; targeting mechanisms 
warrant improvement, and ensure that RSBY participation leads to cashless care. The differences in 
effectiveness between both states suggests that regulatory and infrastructural reform, may lead to 
more effective coverage. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Improving access to adequate healthcare services and financial protection features high on policy 
agendas of low and middle income countries.  In India, a developing country with a third of the 
population living below the poverty line and nearly 94% of the workforce in the informal sector, 
there has been little or no access to effective social protection schemes against catastrophic medical 
expenditures until recently (1).i Healthcare costs are typically financed out of pocket (OOP) and 
patients have strong preferences for private care providers, despite the country boasting a free public 
healthcare system (3, 4).ii Hospitalizations alone, account for more than a quarter of the population 
falling into poverty every year (6-8).  
Since the 1990s, a number of interventions have been launched to fill this vacuum, with community 
based health insurance (CBHI) schemes being amongst the most popular (9, 10). Implemented 
predominantly by non-government organizations, these schemes are generally characterized by 
limited voluntary participation and shallow benefit packages (11). Their effectiveness in promoting 
healthcare utilization and providing financial protection are consequently mixed (12, 13). The 
Government of India (GoI) has also been active in this domain through a number of national and 
local schemes (14, 15).iii High administrative costs, lack of accountability and sustained efforts in 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation have however, led to the dissolution of many such 
programmes (5, 15, 17, 18).  Taking into account the shortcomings of previous endeavours, in 2008, 
the GoI launched the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) insurance programme (19).  A 
national level programme, the RSBY is expected to eventually provide universal healthcare coverage 
(UHC) (18, 20, 21).  
Administered by state governments in partnership with private insurance companies, the heavily 
subsidized RSBY targets households below the poverty line (BPL) and provides cashless protection 
against hospitalization costs.iv Families of up to five persons pay an annual premium of INR 30 per 
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year for protection against hospitalization costs of up to INR 30,000 in any of the empanelled 
hospitals.  The programme has been rolled out in 436 (of 479 targeted) districts in all 29 states of the 
country and enrolled 37 million households (approximately 55% of total BPL households) since 
2008 (19). From 2011, the RSBY has also been piloting outpatient coverage across eight districts (23, 
24). 
Seven years after the start of the program, the evidence base on various aspects of the RSBY 
remains sparse.  Sun (25) presents one of the first studies to investigate the determinants of 
enrolment using village level census data from seven states. The study reveals some evidence of 
cream-skimming by insurance companies in that they prioritize enrolling healthier villages first. 
Similarly, there is greater enrolment in villages with a larger number of BPL households, increased 
distance from the nearest town and greater availability of education and medical facilities. The 
second part of the study uses household level data to conclude that there is gender preference 
towards men when enrolling households with more than 5 members. Using a combination of district 
level data from 2007-2008 from 590 districts and matching it with the District Level Household 
Data survey, Nandi et al. (24) examine how socioeconomics, political and institutional factors 
correlate with RSBY participation at the district level.  The paper first estimates the probability of a 
district participating in RSBY, followed by a model of the determinants of household enrolment in 
participating RSBY districts. They conclude that districts with a higher scheduled caste or tribe 
(SCST) population, weaker administrative capacity and pre-existing insurance schemes experience 
lower participation and enrolment rates. To understand the importance of insurance literacy in 
engaging potential clients, Das and Leino (26) collect household data to assess the impact of the 
Information and Education Campaign (IEC) on enrolment into the RSBY in Delhi. They find that 
IEC is not associated with higher enrolment and suggest the timing of the campaign (two months 
prior to the enrolment) as a potential explanation.  
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Evidence on the impact of the scheme on health care use and financial protection thus far has been 
mixed. Nandi et al. (24) find greater benefits of the programme being captured by higher 
socioeconomic groups. Hou and Palacios (27) observe higher rates of healthcare utilization among 
RSBY households. Neither of the studies however control for either observable or unobservable 
characteristics that may influence insurance uptake and health care use. Devadasan et al. (21) find 
continuing OOP despite RSBY membership, but the use of cross-sectional data also limits their 
ability to control for self-selection and hence claims of causality.  Selvaraj and Karan (28) do control 
for district-level heterogeneity in observable and (time invariant) unobserved characteristics by using 
difference-in-differences on data from 321 RSBY districts and 291 non-RSBY districts in the 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu states. The authors find that hospitals in RSBY districts 
inflate their costs over time due to weak scheme administration and operational oversight, leading to 
increases in expenses for inpatient care. This culminates in a greater likelihood of RSBY households 
facing catastrophic levels of expenditures.  
This paper adds to the literature on RSBY in several ways.  First, we analyse household level 
determinants of RSBY enrolment using household level panel data collected in 2012 and 2013.   
Earlier studies are primarily derived from administrative data collected during the initial stages of the 
programme (2008-2010). Second, this is the first study to investigate the determinants of dropping 
out of the scheme. Retaining membership is an important indicator of the sustainability/usefulness 
of the scheme. Third, we investigate whether RSBY membership is associated with increased use of 
hospital care and financial protection.  Finally, this is the first paper to focus on the scheme in Uttar 
Pradesh (UP) and Bihar which are among the poorest and least educated states in the country.  
The paper is organised as follows: The following section describes the details of the RSBY 
programme. Section 2 discusses the data while section 3 outlines the empirical approach. Section 4 
presents the results and the final section contains a discussion and concluding remarks.  
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1.1 Background 
The RSBY caters to the largely illiterate BPL households with little financial liquidity, by introducing 
smart cards that provide cashless care in any of the empanelled hospitals (29). In collaboration with 
the central government, the state governments recruit insurance companies through a competitive 
bidding process to launch the schemes. Insurance companies are paid a premium per beneficiary 
household such that they have an incentive to enrol more households (up to INR 750/beneficiary 
household). These companies are also tasked to empanel both public and private hospitals which are 
compensated directly for treating RSBY registered patients.  The insurance companies are 
responsible for the monitoring of the hospital activities to ensure quality and prevent misuse (1). In 
order to monitor RSBY, a quality control mechanism is in place at the national level, but actual 
implementation lies with states. The state government is expected to monitor the selected insurance 
agencies and the hospitals that are attached. To what extent state government is ensuring the 
monitoring and quality control is unclear. There is a grievance redressal mechanism as well, but there 
is scant information on who is covering this and processes thereof.  
The scheme is heavily subsidized and the benefit package may be considered very generous in 
comparison to the small premium paid by clients. The package includes more than 700 pre-defined 
surgical packages for maternal and neonatal care, coverage for same-day surgeries and transport 
costs to and from the hospital. Providers are paid on a fee-for-service basic with packages defined 
for each of the covered procedures (30) . All pre-existing diseases are covered under the scheme 
(19). While three quarters of the total costs are paid by the central government, the rest, including 
the cost of smart cards are paid by state governments. Depending on the state where the programme 
is being implemented, the government pays up to INR 750 per household to bridge the costs (29). 
The average subsidy per household paid by the state governments are INR 262 and INR 490 in UP 
and Bihar respectively (19). 
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Insurance companies begin the enrolment process by first implementing awareness campaigns at the 
village level, prioritizing those with greater proportions of BPL households (based on a BPL list 
created in 2001). Members are provided an opportunity to renew coverage towards the end of each 
calendar year (31). Since 2008 nearly 37 million BPL households have enrolled in the programme 
(19). With the enrolment process nearly complete (the scheme has been offered in 436 of 479 
targeted districts), the proportions of the target group enrolled stand at 55% (19). It is important to 
note that the enrolment proportions are likely to be overestimated as they reflect cumulative 
enrolment which does not take into account dropouts. The RSBY began operating in UP in 
December 2008, while enrolment in Bihar started nearly a year later.  
The RSBY is not without criticisms. First, the list of BPL households used in enrolment procedures 
was created between 2001 and 2002 and is therefore likely to be outdated leading to accusations of 
fraud and mis-targeting (25, 32). Concerns regarding the programme’s operations have also been 
raised. Though designed to be cashless, due to lower educational and socioeconomic status, the 
RSBY covered patients are often unable to gain enough information or are unable to exercise their 
rights sufficiently (33, 34). Examples of this include the implementation of unnecessary and invasive 
procedures to claim money from insurance companies, and charging patients for medicines or tests 
allegedly not covered by the scheme. Das and Leino (26) point out that insurance companies are 
largely preoccupied with “outright” fraud prevention rather than assessing the medical necessities of 
the many procedures that are performed. Additionally, private hospitals were found to be reluctant 
to treat RSBY insured patients because the fees are considered insufficiently generous or because of 
disputes with insurance companies over compensation (such as delayed payment, disagreement over 
necessity of certain procedures) (33, 35).  
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2.0 Data  
2.1 Data collection  
The data used in this paper were collected as a part of an evaluation of three CBHI schemes rolled 
out in Kanpur Dehat and Pratapgarh districts in Uttar Pradesh and in Vaishali in Bihar. The surveys 
were implemented among all Self-Help Group households in the three locations.v Though the 
surveys did not collect information on BPL status, qualitative data collection suggests nearly two 
thirds of the sample own BPL cards and should be eligible for RSBY.vi  
The baseline survey was canvassed between March and May 2010 and covered 3,686 households 
(the full census of SHG related households in these districts).vii  The follow up survey was conducted 
between March and April in 2012 during which 3318 households were revisited. During the same 
time the following year, 3307 households were re-interviewed for the third time. As some of our 
variables, related to insurance awareness, were only collected in the 2012 and 2013 surveys, we only 
use the latter two survey waves in our analyses of enrolment and dropout. The primary respondents 
were the SHG members themselves or the head of the household if the member was not available.  
 
2.2 Variables  
The household survey collected detailed information on demographic and socioeconomic status, as 
well as information on healthcare utilization, expenses and coping strategies for both out- and 
inpatient care. Given the focus on RSBY in this paper, we primarily focus on inpatient care data that 
was collected with a recall period of one year. 
2.2.1 Determinants of RSBY membership and non-renewals  
To model the determinants of enrolment, we use data from 2012 and 2013 that contains an indicator 
of whether the household was enrolled in RSBY in the specific survey wave. To analyse factors 
 9 
 
associated with dropping out, we only consider households that were enrolled in 2012 and have 
dropped by the subsequent wave in 2013.  
We consider four categories of variables as possible determinants of enrolment and dropout from 
RSBY (see annex Table A1 for exact definitions). The first represents health related characteristics 
of the households: proportion of household members suffering from chronic illnessviii and a binary 
variable depicting whether any members were hospitalized in the previous year.  
The second category represents healthcare supply side characteristics and includes the (logarithm of 
the) average distance members of a community have to travel to reach a hospital.ix  Unfortunately we 
do not have information on whether the hospital is empanelled by RSBY in the survey.x  
The third category contains household characteristics related to insurance literacy and risk aversion. 
We include an indicator of whether any members are enrolled in the CBHI scheme and an index 
depicting the understanding of insurance.xi, xii Three questions were included in the index: whether 
the particular household was exposed to any insurance awareness campaigns; the respondent 
understands the concept of premiums and insurance in general; and whether the respondent believes 
such schemes can be beneficial. This index is represented in the models as tertiles of scores obtained 
from principal component analysis of questions applicable to insurance schemes.  
The fourth category relates to demographic conditions such as the sex of the household head, 
household members’ age and sex distribution and socioeconomic characteristics including education, 
occupational and educational status of the household head, whether the household belongs to a 
scheduled caste or tribe (SCST), and tertiles of an asset index  generated through principal 
component analysis.xiii  
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2.2.2 Effect of RSBY on the use and financing of inpatient care  
After having established patterns of enrolment and dropout, we investigate whether participating in 
the RSBY is associated with a higher probability of any hospitalizations within the household, a 
lower probability of having any expenses when hospitalized, lower direct cost of the hospitalization, 
lower probability of resorting to debt to finance the hospitalization, and finally a lower amount of 
debt incurred (conditional upon incurring any debt).xiv  
 
2.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows rates of enrolment and non-renewals in 2010, 2012 and 2013. Among 3,685 
households surveyed in 2010, 28% were already enrolled. In 2012, 14% of the households dropped 
out while the total proportion of enrolled increased to 31%. A considerable shift in enrolment is 
noted between 2012 and 2013. The proportion of enrolled increases to 51% while dropout reduces 
to 8% in 2013. Over time, the differences in state-level enrolment rates diminish and (at baseline 
enrolment rates are 18% in UP and 41% in Bihar) the proportion of enrolled increased in UP by 
2013. Although more households drop out of the scheme in Bihar in 2012 (19%) than in UP (14%), 
the rates are more comparable in 2013 (8% and 11% respectively). The enrolment rates at the village 
level vary considerably (between 7% and 78%). Overall, despite the relatively modest enrolment 
rates, the low drop-out rates are suggestive of the perceived positive effects of RSBY by the insured.  
Table 1: Membership in RSBY 
  Pooled Uttar Pradesh Bihar 
  2010 2012 2013 2010 2012 2013 2010 2012 2013 
Enrolled (renewal and new) 0.28 0.31 0.51 0.18 0.21 0.41 0.47 0.48 0.68 
Dropped out (from previous period)  0.14 0.08  0.10 0.08  0.19 0.11 
Not enrolled 0.72 0.55 0.41 0.82 0.69 0.51 0.53 0.33 0.21 
Households in RSBY 1048 1039 1678 415 431 874 633 608 804 
N 3685 3318 3307 2322 2045 2087 1363 1246 1183 
 
Means of health and health care use related outcomes in 2010 among those enrolled in RSBY and 
those not enrolled are presented in Table 2 (summary statistics of outcomes in 2012 and 2013 in the 
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pooled sample are presented in Annex Table A2). Comparing RSBY and non-RSBY households in 
the pooled data suggests that only the average distance to facilities significantly differs between the 
two groups (27km and 37km respectively). Other factors such as the proportion of members with 
chronic illnesses (17% and 14%) and the likelihood of hospitalization (19% for both) are do not vary 
across the groups. When hospitalized, almost all households, both RSBY and non-RSBY covered, 
incur out of pocket payments. The amount of expenses incurred by RSBY and non-RSBY 
households (INR 12034 and INR 14020), the probability of incurring any debt (80% and 79%) and 
the amount of debt do not differ significantly. State-level disaggregation suggests the significant 
difference in the distance to facilities across both groups to stem from Bihar. Similarly, RSBY 
households in this state are marginally more likely to incur debt when dealing with the expenses of a 
hospitalization.   
Table 2: Summary statistics of outcome variables in 2010 
Definition 
HH with 
RSBY 
membersh
ip 
HH 
without 
RSBY 
membersh
ip 
Test: 
RSBY 
HH=No
n-RSBY 
HH 
Test: 
RSBY 
HH=No
n-RSBY 
HH 
Test: 
RSBY 
HH=No
n-RSBY 
HH 
Pooled Data 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Bihar 
  
P-value 
(1) 
P-value 
(2) 
P-value 
(3) 
Proportion of household (HH) members with 
chronic illnesses 0.17 0.14 0.773 0.163 0.145 
Any hospitalizations in the household (1/0) 0.19 0.19 0.105 0.510 0.102 
Probability of  incurring expenses due to 
hospitalization(1/0) 
0.98 0.97 0.824 0.992 0.168 
Direct hospitalization expenses (INR) 12034 14020 0.214 0.210 0.440 
Standard Deviation (31846) (33290)    
Average distance to facility (km) 27.23 37.02 0.000 0.461 0.000 
Standard Deviation (24.42) (24.17)    
Household with debt due hospitalization (1/0) 0.86 0.80 0.104 0.370 0.089 
Debt amount (INR) 8187 8328 0.894 0.243 0.951 
Standard Deviation (20096) (15790)       
Notes: Table shows summary statistics across RSBY and non-RSBY households in 2010.  P-values 1 through 3 
refer to t-tests comparing means of the enrolled and non-enrolled at the pooled level and by sites.  
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A similar comparison of household level characteristics among the two groups in 2010 is presented 
in Annex Table A1 (summary statistics of control variables in 2012 and 2013 in the pooled sample 
are presented in Annex Table A3). As 2010 represents the baseline of the CBHI scheme for which 
the information was collected, enrolment in the CBHI scheme is missing. Similarly, information 
related to insurance related awareness was not collected until 2012. Regarding demographic 
variations in RSBY and non-RSBY households, the former have a higher proportion of working 
aged women (14-55 years) and a lower proportion of elderly women (55+ years).  
RSBY enrolled household do appear to have lower socioeconomic status as those not-enrolled. 
Household heads among the non-enrolled are generally better educated (e.g., 45% of RSBY 
household heads have no education compared to 38% among non-RSBY) and belong to higher 
socioeconomic groups. Figure 1 shows distribution of insured households across wealth tertiles. 
While a clear and steep gradient is visible in Bihar where the highest proportion of enrolled 
households belong to the lowest asset tertile, trends in UP are not as clear (highest proportion 
belong to households in the middle tertile), potentially indicating problems with the targeting of the 
scheme (or the BPL cards) in UP. Enrolled households are more likely to belong to scheduled castes 
or tribes. A higher proportion of non-RSBY household heads are self-employed (43% vs 48%) 
whereas the opposite is true among the enrolled for casual wage labouring (32% vs 24%).  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of enrolled households across wealth tertiles in 2010 
 
In sum, these descriptive statistics suggest relatively little differences between households enrolled in 
RSBY and those not enrolled, at least in 2010. This could be indicative of little problems of adverse 
selection, but also of little impact of the scheme. The following section describes the regression 
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approaches used to identify the determinants of enrolment and non-renewals and to identify 
whether RSBY membership is associated with increased health care use and health care spending.   
 
3.0 Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Determinants of RSBY membership and non-renewals 
We first investigate factors correlated with membership, defined as household (i) having RSBY 
coverage at time (t) in village (v) using the following linear probability model: 
𝑟𝑠𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑣 = 𝛤
′
𝑖𝑡𝑣𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣 + 𝛱
′
𝑖𝑡𝑣𝛽3 +  𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝑣𝛽4 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑣 
[𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 2012, 2013]                                                              (1) 
where 𝛤′𝑖𝑡𝑣 represents a vector of health related variables, and 𝐷𝑖𝑣 represents the average distance 
to the hospitals. The household’s insurance awareness related characteristics are captured by 𝛱′𝑖𝑡𝑣,. 
A vector of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics is expressed through 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝑣. We control 
for time trends (𝑡𝑡) and geographical variations through village fixed effects (𝑣𝑣).
xv 
The probability of not renewing the subscription in 2013 (conditional upon being enrolled in 2012), 
is modelled using the same explanatory variables as in equation (1), set at their 2013 values, that is:  
𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣 = 𝛤
′
𝑖𝑣𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝐷𝑖𝑣 + 𝛱
′
𝑖𝑣𝜃3 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑣𝜃4 +  𝑣𝑣 +  𝜇𝑖𝑣                                                      (2) 
 
3.2 Associations between RSBY membership and inpatient care use and 
spending 
We estimate the effects of RSBY membership on a battery of outcomes related to inpatient care use 
and spending (probability of hospitalization, probability of having healthcare spending conditional 
on hospitalization, log of the amount of healthcare expenses conditional on any spending, 
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probability of incurring debt to meet healthcare expenses and the amount of debt, conditional on 
having any debt). For every outcome (𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑣) we estimate the following linear model with household 
fixed effects: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑣 = 𝛺1𝑟𝑠𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑣 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑣
′ 𝛺2 + 𝛺3𝛿𝑖𝑣 + 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑣                                             (3) 
[𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 2010, 2012, 2013]                                             
 
where 𝑡𝑡 captures common time trends in healthcare use across households and  𝛼𝑖 captures time 
invariant household level characteristics.xvi 𝑟𝑠𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑣 is the key variable of interest that reflects 
whether the household i in village 𝑣 is enrolled in RSBY at time t.xvii 
𝛺1 identifies the effect of RSBY membership on outcome 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑣 under the assumption that there are 
no time-varying unobservables that correlate with both RSBY membership and the outcomes of 
interest. Given the targeting of the program to BPL households, and our inability to perfectly 
control for BPL status, and the voluntary nature of the program, this is a strong assumption. We 
expect our rich set of covariates to largely capture the self-selection into the program, especially 
because the program is highly subsidized and therefore attractive to the large majority of 
households.xviii To reduce the potential bias due to unobserved differences in socioeconomic 
characteristics that arise from the targeting of the program, we test sensitivity of our results by 
restricting the sample to the bottom two wealth thirds.xix It should be stressed though that our 
identifying assumptions might be violated, and we therefore interpret our results as associations 
rather than causal impacts. 
Robustness of results is confirmed using non-linear specifications for the binary outcomes (results 
available upon request). All analysis was done using STATA version 13.0. 
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4.0 Results 
4.2 Determinants of enrolment   
Table 3 shows coefficients of the OLS model examining factors associated with enrolment in RSBY 
in 2012 or 2013. We find that the proportion of household members with chronic illness is 
positively correlated with the probability of being enrolled in RSBY (6pp). There is a negative 
correlation between distance to healthcare facilities and enrolment at the pooled level with a 1% 
increase in the distance reducing the probability of enrolment by 1pp. Insurance awareness is 
positively associated with RSBY membership (3pp). Households in the highest tertile of the index 
are 3pp more likely to be enrolled. Similarly, households who joined CBHI schemes are also more 
likely to be enrolled in RSBY (3pp), potentially indicating higher aversion to risk.  
Table 3: Determinants of RSBY membership in 2012 and 2013 
  Pooled Uttar Pradesh Bihar 
Variables 
Marginal 
Effects 
Stand
ard 
Error 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Proportion of household members with 
chronic illnesses (% of household) 
0.056** 0.027 0.030 0.034 0.097** 0.046 
Log of average Distance from facility -0.008* 0.005 -0.010 0.030 0.004 0.016 
Low insurance index score(1/0) -0.010 0.035 -0.001 0.042 -0.038 0.063 
High insurance index score (1/0) 0.026** 0.012 0.028* 0.015 0.019 0.021 
Enrolled in CBHI(1/0) 0.032* 0.016 0.038* 0.021 0.016 0.027 
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) -0.006 0.015 -0.014 0.019 0.001 0.025 
Highest asset tertile (1/0) -0.039*** 0.014 -0.028* 0.017 -0.058** 0.028 
Household belongs to a scheduled 
tribe/caste (1/0) 
0.070*** 0.014 0.069*** 0.017 0.077*** 0.026 
Primary education (1/0) -0.034* 0.019 -0.015 0.023 -0.071** 0.032 
Secondary education (1/0) -0.042*** 0.016 -0.026 0.020 -0.069** 0.028 
Higher secondary education (1/0) -0.060*** 0.023 -0.014 0.027 -0.169*** 0.044 
Other employment (1/0) -0.016 0.025 0.007 0.030 -0.065 0.048 
Casual wage labourer (1/0) 0.023 0.016 0.028 0.020 0.012 0.026 
Not working (1/0) -0.010 0.025 -0.035 0.028 0.068 0.050 
Doing housework (1/0) -0.021 0.021 -0.016 0.026 -0.029 0.036 
Female headed household (1/0) 0.009 0.020 0.012 0.025 0.013 0.033 
Household size 0.011*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.004 0.016** 0.006 
Female 0 to 13yrs (1/0) -0.103** 0.048 -0.108* 0.060 -0.084 0.083 
Female older than 55 (1/0) -0.131*** 0.050 -0.125** 0.059 -0.140 0.097 
Male 0 to 13yrs (1/0) -0.139*** 0.047 -0.145** 0.058 -0.141* 0.082 
Male 14 to 55yrs (1/0) -0.037 0.048 -0.053 0.057 -0.006 0.090 
Male older than 55 (1/0) -0.025 0.072 0.033 0.085 -0.157 0.133 
Year: 2012 0.215*** 0.013 0.219*** 0.016 0.207*** 0.022 
Observations 6,367 4,085 2,282 
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Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using village level fixed effects. The binary dependent variable 
whether a household is enrolled in RSBY in 2012 or 2013. Joint significance tests for the village dummies found to 
be significant at the 1% level for all models. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Associations between socioeconomic variables and RSBY membership confirm the pro-poor 
targeting of the scheme. Households in the highest asset tertile are 4pp less likely to be enrolled 
compared to those in the middle. Members of scheduled castes or tribes (SCST) are more likely to 
enrol in the programme (7pp). Household heads with primary secondary or higher-secondary 
education, are less likely to be enrolled (3pp, 4pp and 6pp respectively).  
Regarding demographics, we find that larger households are more likely to enrol (1pp), which likely 
is related to the premium not rising with household size (up to 5 members).   Interestingly, 
households with a higher proportion of children or older women are less likely to be enrolled.  
There appears relatively little variation in these associations across states.  Factors such as the 
insurance awareness and CBHI membership only play a part in enrolment decisions among 
households in UP (3pp and 4pp respectively). Any education among household heads is only 
negatively associated with enrolment in Bihar (7pp for primary, 7pp for secondary and 17pp for 
higher-secondary education). As already expected from Figure 1, RSBY membership, conditional on 
other characteristics, is more concentrated among the poor in Bihar as compared to UP. 
4.3 Determinants of non-renewals 
Table 4 presents results from an OLS model analysing the determinants of not renewing RSBY 
membership in 2013, conditional upon being enrolled in 2012.  Households with members who are 
chronically ill are much less likely to drop out.  An increase in the proportion of chronically ill 
members (by 1pp) reduces the probability of non-renewal by 12pp. Households belonging to SCST 
are also  less likely (12pp) to drop out from the RSBY. Lastly, household size is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of dropping out at the pooled level (3pp). 
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Table 4: Determinants of non-renewals in 2013 
  Pooled   Uttar Pradesh   Bihar   
Variables 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Proportion of household 
members with chronic illnesses 
(percent of household) 
-0.118* 0.067 0.008 0.120 -0.195** 0.078 
Any hospitalizations in the 
household (1/0) 
0.048 0.041 0.081 0.075 0.047 0.048 
Log of average Distance from 
facility 
0.019 0.030 0.070 0.111 0.022 0.031 
Low insurance index 
score(1/0) 
0.037 0.142 -0.109 0.289 0.083 0.158 
High insurance index score 
(1/0) 
-0.012 0.030 0.021 0.054 -0.031 0.035 
Enrolled in CBHI(1/0) -0.006 0.040 -0.015 0.072 -0.003 0.048 
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) 0.038 0.036 0.052 0.068 0.017 0.041 
Highest asset tertile (1/0) 0.045 0.037 0.051 0.060 0.042 0.048 
Household belongs to a 
scheduled tribe/caste (1/0) 
-0.120*** 0.034 -0.139** 0.057 -0.113*** 0.044 
Primary education (1/0) 0.071 0.046 0.090 0.083 0.051 0.055 
Secondary education (1/0) -0.017 0.039 -0.019 0.067 -0.014 0.048 
Higher secondary education 
(1/0) 
0.070 0.060 0.059 0.093 0.059 0.087 
Other employment (1/0) 0.005 0.076 -0.029 0.120 0.026 0.104 
Casual wage labourer (1/0) 0.034 0.038 0.017 0.071 0.051 0.045 
Not working (1/0) 0.022 0.065 0.195* 0.114 -0.094 0.077 
Doing housework (1/0) 0.033 0.050 -0.008 0.094 0.046 0.058 
Female headed household 
(1/0) 
-0.053 0.047 -0.007 0.087 -0.059 0.055 
Household size -0.028*** 0.009 -0.041*** 0.014 -0.018 0.011 
Female 0 to 13yrs (1/0) 0.122 0.121 0.312 0.210 0.027 0.153 
Female older than 55 (1/0) 0.118 0.145 -0.047 0.257 0.210 0.174 
Male 0 to 13yrs (1/0) 0.091 0.120 0.229 0.210 0.018 0.149 
Male 14 to 55yrs (1/0) -0.14 0.134 -0.12 0.223 -0.15 0.170 
Male older than 55 (1/0) 0.125 0.202 -0.156 0.338 0.338 0.256 
Observations 956 408 548 
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using village level fixed effects. The binary dependent variable 
shows whether the household did not renew its subscription to the RSBY in 2013, conditional upon being enrolled 
in 2012. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Variation across states is once again limited. Adverse selection is more pronounced in Bihar, while 
there is no significant correlation between the proportion of household members with a chronic 
illness and RSBY dropout in Uttar Pradesh. Overall, we find fewer significant effects in models of 
dropout as compared to those of enrolment, which might be related to the relatively low drop-out 
rates and smaller sample size. The presence of chronic illnesses, being a member of SCST and 
household size play a positive role in both enrolling and remaining in the scheme. Factors such as 
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average distance from inpatient facilities, understanding of insurance, wealth and household 
demographics are related to enrolment but are not significantly related to of the probability of 
dropping out of RSBY. 
 
4.4 Associations between RSBY membership and inpatient care use and 
spending 
Table 5 presents results on the changes in health care use and spending that are associated with 
RSBY membership. The first row of results shows effects on the probability of hospitalization 
within a household over the preceding year. This is followed by the effects on the likelihood of 
incurring any expenses, and the amount spent, both conditional upon being hospitalized. We further 
investigate whether participation precipitates any change in the probability of incurring debt due to 
this hospitalization and the amount of debt, conditional on borrowing. 
 
Table 5: Associations between RSBY membership and inpatient care use and 
spending 
  Pooled UP Bihar 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Probability of hospitalizations 
(1/0) 
0.000 (0.010) -0.010 (0.013) 0.015 (0.017) 
Observations 10125 6359 3766 
Probability of having healthcare 
expenses conditional on use (1/0) 
0.007 (0.026) 0.001 (0.042) 0.007 (0.031) 
Observations 1413 836 577 
Log of healthcare expenses 
conditional on spending (INR) 
-0.056 (0.170) 0.224 (0.296) -0.361* (0.190) 
Observations 1361 804 577 
Probability of debt conditional on 
use (1/0) 
0.061 (0.058) 0.059 (0.085) 0.017 (0.083) 
Observations 1413 836 577 
Log of the amount of debt 
conditional on borrowing (INR) 
-0.078 (0.206) 0.251 (0.353) -0.547** (0.232) 
Observations 1100 643 457 
Notes: Table shows coefficients of OLS models using household level fixed effects. Logged forms of healthcare 
expenses and the amount of debt are used in the respective models. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
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RSBY membership is not significantly associated with the likelihood of hospitalization or the 
likelihood of positive spending within a household, the latter most likely related to high likelihood of 
having expenses at baseline. This is true for the pooled sample, and for both of the state specific 
samples. We do however find RSBY membership to be associated with a reduction in OOP 
spending in Bihar (36%). RSBY households in Bihar concurrently experience a 55% reduction in the 
amount of debt incurred in dealing with the cost of hospitalization. We find no significant effects on 
financial protection in UP. We carry out additional sensitivity analysis by restricting the sample to 
households in the bottom two asset tertiles. Results in general are comparable and are presented in 
Annex Table A5.  
 
5.0 Discussion and concluding remarks  
The Government of India (GoI) initiated Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in 2008 to 
provide inpatient insurance coverage to below-poverty-line (BPL) households in India. To date, the 
RSBY provides coverage to nearly 37 million BPL households across all 29 states. This paper 
examines three aspects of the programme taking place in the Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar states of 
India. Using household level panel data, we first examine determinants of enrolment into RSBY 
followed by the determinants of dropping out of the scheme. Lastly, the paper investigates whether 
RSBY membership is associated with increases in hospitalization rates and decreases in spending on 
inpatient care.  
By 2013, more than half of our sample is enrolled in RSBY (51%). We do not have information on 
BPL status, but would expect about two-thirds of our sample to have BPL status, which would 
mean that coverage of RSBY in these states is reasonably high. While we do find coverage to be 
more concentrated among the poorest, the socioeconomic gradient is very weak in UP. This could 
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be related to either some mistargeting of RSBY or mistargeting of BPL cards. Our findings 
correspond with observations made in similar studies. Sun (25) for example speculated that the fact 
that the BPL list had been created nearly a decade prior to the launch of the RSBY considerably 
increased the potential for mistargeting. Subsequently, evidence of leakage was found by both Nandi 
et al. (24) and Bahcchi (32). 
Analysis of the determinants of enrolment into the scheme reveals several insights. Firstly, the 
positive correlation between existing chronic conditions and enrolment suggests problems of 
adverse selection which might threaten sustainability of the scheme. The programme’s pro-poor 
targeting is reflected in a higher concentration of poor wealth groups, lower educated households 
and SCST households among the enrolled. Insurance related awareness plays a considerable role in 
the household’s decision to join the scheme. Additionally, we find enrolment rates vary considerably 
across villages (ranges between 7% and 78%), which might reflect geographical factors or variation 
in the efficacy of the RSBY partners (insurance companies) in enrolment activities. Distance to the 
nearest facility is negatively correlated to the likelihood of enrolling in the scheme. This indicates 
that the insured are indeed sensitive to accessibility and quality of care. Strengthening the health 
infrastructure by improving its quality and access will likely encourage more eligible households to 
join.   
We find that the drop-out rates among RSBY households are relatively low (11% on average), 
suggesting that the program is considered to offer good value for (a limited amount of) money. 
Households with chronic illnesses are less likely to drop-out, further suggesting problems of adverse 
selection. SCST households are more likely to retain their membership.  
We do not find RSBY membership to be associated with an increased likelihood of using inpatient 
care.  The association between RSBY membership and financial protection appears to differ across 
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the states. While no effects are seen among RSBY households in UP, insurance coverage is 
associated with a substantial reduction in OOP (36%) and the amount of debt incurred (55%) in 
Bihar. This contradicts the findings of an earlier study focusing on Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu by Selvaraj and Karan (2012), who find that that weak scheme administration, lack of 
effective operational oversight and absence of accountability mechanisms led to increased expenses 
in inpatient care. This difference in results is likely driven by the fact that each state has a 
heterogeneous number of players and methods of implementation. The larger effect in Bihar, as 
compared to UP, could be related to the development efforts by the Bihar government since 2005.xx 
These efforts include attempts to improve upon and enlarge access to basic services such as 
transportation and primary, secondary and vocational education (36). Most importantly, the 
development efforts placed considerable focus on health through upgrading of health infrastructure 
and manpower, outsourcing diagnostic facilities, providing access to free medication, provision of 
emergency services, and maintenance of accountability through web-based monitoring (37).  
Despite the positive effect on financial protection in Bihar, confirming the findings of Devadasan et 
al. (2013), we find that the programme does not provide cashless access to inpatient care.  We find 
the probability of incurring any expenses for hospitalization to be close to one in both states for the 
whole sample.  This might be related to RSBY not covering the full costs of treatment given to 
insured patients, or to problems of awareness among the low SES target group of RSBY. 
There are some limitations to this paper. First and foremost, the surveys did not collect information 
regarding the respondent households’ BPL status and the duration of enrolment in the RSBY. We 
are unable to ascertain whether the respondents, when hospitalized, in fact sought care from RSBY 
empanelled institutions. The data on which the paper is based were collected to gauge the impact of 
a CBHI scheme and is restricted to SHG households. Furthermore, as we have a relatively small 
sample of households which experienced hospitalization, models that are conditional on use may 
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have low statistical power. RSBY was clearly not rolled out in a randomized way. While we do 
control for a rich set of observable characteristics and household fixed effects, there may still be 
unobservable time-varying characteristics that correlate with both the uptake of RSBY and the need 
for inpatient care. Notwithstanding these limitations, our study concludes that RSBY is indeed pro-
poor, but there is evidence of adverse selection which might jeopardize long term sustainability. 
While insured households still need to make OOP payments for inpatient care in both states, RSBY 
is associated with increased financial protection in Bihar. 
RSBY has the potential to contribute to India’s move towards UHC. A further, more qualitative 
investigation, of the differences in RSBY implementation and management across the two states will 
provide useful insights on how to improve effectiveness of RSBY in UP.  The focus on inpatient 
coverage might be a further point of concern. It is likely that generous inpatient care coverage in the 
absence of outpatient coverage might lead to inefficient and unnecessary use of hospital care.xxi Like 
many LMICs India is experiencing an epidemiological shift towards non-communicable diseases 
(39), and the management of such conditions, typically through outpatient based care,  has been 
found to represent one of the largest shares of households’ health related expenditures (34).  Moving 
forward to UHC will therefore also have to entail an extension of outpatient care coverage, either 
through RSBY or separate schemes (34). Improving the targeting of RSBY, through a revision of the 
BPL list, should also rank high on the policy agenda.   
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8.0 Annex: 
Table A1: Summary statistics of control variables in 2010 
Definition 
Households 
with RSBY 
membership 
Households 
without RSBY 
membership 
Test: RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH 
Test: RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH 
Test: RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH 
Pooled Data 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Bihar 
  P-value (1) P-value (2) P-value (3) 
Insurance      
Client of CBHI (1/0) 0.00 0.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Insurance awareness index 
(ranging from 0 to 1) 
0.00 0.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Demographics      
female headed household (1/0) 0.24 0.23 0.444 0.399 0.456 
household size 5.76 5.81 0.539 0.162 0.062 
Female 0-13 years (1/0) 0.18 0.16 0.000 0.681 0.214 
Female 14-55 years (1/0) 0.29 0.31 0.006 0.972 0.016 
Female 55 year+ (1/0) 0.05 0.05 0.057 0.035 0.060 
Male 0-13 years (1/0) 0.19 0.19 0.729 0.004 0.759 
Male 14-55 years (1/0) 0.25 0.26 0.009 0.521 0.431 
Male 55 year+ (1/0) 0.04 0.04 0.941 0.810 0.859 
Socioeconomics      
no education (1/0) 0.45 0.38 0.000 0.707 0.030 
primary education (1/0) 0.16 0.15 0.622 0.539 0.927 
secondary education (1/0) 0.31 0.35 0.016 0.714 0.786 
higher secondary education (1/0) 0.08 0.12 0.000 0.487 0.000 
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) 0.43 0.35 0.000 0.535 0.008 
Middle asset tertile (1/0) 0.34 0.33 0.611 0.345 0.210 
Highest asset tertile (1/0) 0.23 0.32 0.000 0.108 0.000 
household belongs to a scheduled 
tribe/caste (1/0) 
0.40 0.29 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
self-employed (1/0) 0.43 0.48 0.011 0.605 0.383 
other employment (1/0) 0.04 0.08 0.000 0.073 0.049 
casual wage labourer (1/0) 0.32 0.24 0.000 0.316 0.003 
not working (1/0) 0.05 0.06 0.030 0.907 0.255 
doing housework (1/0) 0.16 0.14 0.105 0.640 0.338 
Location      
Bihar 0.54 0.27    
UP 0.46 0.73       
Notes: Table shows summary statistics across RSBY and non-RSBY households in 2010.  P-values 1 through 3 
refer to results derived from t-tests comparing values from the enrolled and non-enrolled at the pooled level and 
by sites. 
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Table A2: Summary statistics of outcome variables for pooled sample in 2012 and 2013 
Definition 
Households 
with RSBY 
membership 
Households 
without RSBY 
membership 
Test: RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH 
Households 
with RSBY 
membership 
Households 
without RSBY 
membership 
Test: RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH 
2012 2013 
    P-value      P-value  
Proportion of household members with chronic illnesses 0.255 0.233 0.014 0.266 0.256 0.243 
Any hospitalizations in the household (1/0) 0.138 0.126 0.342 0.144 0.127 0.162 
Probability of  incurring expenses due to hospitalization(1/0) 0.944 0.968 0.230 0.963 0.931 0.132 
Direct hospitalization expenses (INR) 16876 19912 0.518 16452 17927 0.633 
Standard Deviation (42289) (32221)  (23004) (40736)  
Average distance to facility (km) 29 36 0.000 34 39 0.000 
Standard Deviation (24) (17)  (25) (24)  
Household with debt due hospitalization (1/0) 0.720 0.788 0.120 0.805 0.757 0.227 
Debt amount (INR) 10238 11918 0.431 13072 13233 0.933 
Standard Deviation (16704) (35372)   (19854) (20443)   
Notes: Table shows summary statistics across RSBY and non-RSBY households in 2012 and 2013.  P-values refers to t-tests comparing means of the enrolled 
and non-enrolled of the pooled sample.  
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Table A3: Summary statistics of control variables for the pooled sample in 2012 and 2013 
Definition 
Households with 
RSBY 
membership 
Households 
without RSBY 
membership 
Test: RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH 
Households with 
RSBY 
membership 
Households 
without RSBY 
membership 
Test: RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH 
2012 2013 
    P-value     P-value  
Insurance       
Client of CBHI (1/0) 0.343 0.300 0.014 0.331 0.254 0.000 
Insurance awareness index (ranging 
from 0 to 1) 
0.495 0.497 0.765 0.536 0.526 0.090 
Demographics       
female headed household (1/0) 0.313 0.302 0.547 0.294 0.300 0.744 
household size 5.498 5.565 0.440 5.549 5.542 0.933 
Female 0-13 years (1/0) 0.121 0.104 0.002 0.182 0.180 0.716 
Female 14-55 years (1/0) 0.358 0.357 0.877 0.297 0.300 0.571 
Female 55 year+ (1/0) 0.057 0.065 0.124 0.046 0.056 0.040 
Male 0-13 years (1/0) 0.130 0.128 0.698 0.207 0.200 0.267 
Male 14-55 years (1/0) 0.285 0.293 0.249 0.227 0.222 0.343 
Male 55 year+ (1/0) 0.049 0.053 0.400 0.040 0.042 0.590 
Socioeconomics       
no education (1/0) 0.493 0.412 0.000 0.473 0.396 0.000 
primary education (1/0) 0.153 0.153 0.984 0.137 0.160 0.070 
secondary education (1/0) 0.271 0.325 0.002 0.303 0.323 0.214 
higher secondary education (1/0) 0.083 0.111 0.014 0.086 0.121 0.001 
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) 0.401 0.326 0.000 0.312 0.226 0.000 
Middle asset tertile (1/0) 0.349 0.339 0.547 0.344 0.307 0.025 
Highest asset tertile (1/0) 0.250 0.336 0.000 0.345 0.467 0.000 
household belongs to a scheduled 
tribe/caste (1/0) 
0.353 0.316 0.033 0.362 0.290 0.000 
self-employed (1/0) 0.381 0.449 0.000 0.436 0.442 0.732 
other employment (1/0) 0.064 0.088 0.017 0.048 0.055 0.409 
casual wage labourer (1/0) 0.357 0.237 0.000 0.266 0.236 0.047 
not working (1/0) 0.046 0.060 0.110 0.069 0.079 0.246 
doing housework (1/0) 0.152 0.167 0.296 0.181 0.188 0.592 
Location       
Bihar 0.585 0.283 0.000 0.479 0.238 0.000 
UP 0.415 0.717 0.000 0.521 0.762 0.000 
Notes: Table shows summary statistics across RSBY and non-RSBY households in 2012 and 2013.  P-value refers to results derived from t-tests comparing 
values from the enrolled and non-enrolled at the pooled level. 
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Table A4: Determinants of RSBY membership in 2012 and 2013 
  Pooled Uttar Pradesh Bihar 
Variables 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Proportion of household 
members with chronic illnesses 
(percent of household) 
0.046* 0.041 0.032* 0.051 0.055 0.068 
Log of average Distance from 
facility 
0.024 0.024 0.080 0.052 0.006 0.029 
Low insurance index score(1/0) -0.061 0.045 -0.076 0.054 -0.036 0.079 
High insurance index score (1/0) 0.021 0.016 0.024 0.019 0.012 0.027 
Enrolled in CBHI(1/0) 0.019* 0.023 0.050* 0.028 -0.026 0.038 
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) -0.03 0.022 -0.025 0.028 -0.032 0.036 
Highest asset tertile (1/0) 0.013 0.022 0.007 0.026 0.022 0.040 
Primary education (1/0) -0.030 0.032 -0.019 0.042 -0.054* 0.050 
Secondary education (1/0) -0.005** 0.036 0.013 0.046 -0.027 0.059 
Higher secondary education 
(1/0) 
0.054 0.058 0.091 0.071 0.001 0.105 
Other employment (1/0) -0.010 0.038 0.044 0.047 -0.097 0.067 
Casual wage labourer (1/0) -0.009 0.023 0.008 0.029 -0.035 0.038 
Not working (1/0) 0.006 0.037 0.017 0.044 -0.011 0.071 
Doing housework (1/0) -0.020 0.029 -0.002 0.036 -0.053 0.049 
Female headed household (1/0) 0.023 0.036 0.093* 0.048 -0.053 0.057 
Household size 0.023*** 0.007 0.028*** 0.009 0.020 0.014 
Female 0 to 13yrs (1/0) 0.006 0.087 -0.053 0.110 0.083 0.144 
Female older than 55 (1/0) -0.279*** 0.107 -0.262** 0.126 -0.374* 0.214 
Male 0 to 13yrs (1/0) -0.212* 0.115 -0.184 0.142 -0.306 0.197 
Male 14 to 55yrs (1/0) -0.139 0.095 -0.038 0.117 -0.337** 0.169 
Male older than 55 (1/0) -0.064 0.147 -0.054 0.182 -0.065 0.253 
Year: 2013 0.178*** 0.038 0.176*** 0.045 0.186*** 0.070 
Observations 6,367 4,085 2,282 
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using household level fixed effects. The binary dependent 
variable shows whether a household is enrolled in RSBY. Data is pooled across the three survey years. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
Table A5: Effects of RSBY 
  Pooled UP Bihar 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Probability of hospitalizations 
(1/0) 
0.000 (0.013) -0.011 (0.017) 0.014 (0.020) 
Observations 6755 3973 2782 
Probability of having healthcare 
expenses conditional on use (1/0) 
0.014 (0.039) -0.007 (0.078) 0.043 (0.045) 
Observations 897 476 421 
Log of healthcare expenses 
conditional on spending (INR) 
-0.278 (0.195) 0.577 (0.438) -0.675*** (0.234) 
Observations 858 455 403 
Probability of debt conditional 
on use (1/0) 
0.047 (0.074) -0.013 (0.115) 0.174 (0.100) 
Observations 897 476 421 
Log of the amount of debt 
conditional on borrowing (INR) 
-0.166 (0.269) 0.347 (0.572) -0.611*** (0.277) 
Observations 740 385 355 
Notes: Table shows coefficients of OLS models using household level fixed effects. Association between RSBY 
membership and inpatient utilization/financial protection identified for the bottom two-third of the households. 
Logged forms of healthcare expenses and the amount of debt are used in the respective models. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Endnotes 
i Less than 15% of the population was covered by health insurance in 2009 (2). 
ii Private expenditure constitutes 81% of total health expenditure in India of which 94% is out-of-
pocket expenditure (2-5)  
iii Schemes from state governments include Sanjeevani implemented in Punjab, the Chief Minister’s 
Health Insurance scheme in Assam and the Aarogyasri in Andhra Pradesh. At the national level, the 
ministry of finance had implemented the Universal Health Insurance Scheme along with Employees 
State Insurance Scheme and the Central Government Health Scheme (14-16). 
iv Recently the programme has been expanded to include additional categories of poor households 
such as construction workers, rural employment guarantee scheme workers, street vendors and so 
forth (22).  
v A self-help group (SHG) usually consists of between 10–20 poor women living in the same village 
who come together and agree to save a specific amount each period. The savings of all SHG 
members are combined and deposited in a bank or a co-operative organization. Members may 
borrow from the pooled savings when the SHG agrees to give the loans. SHGs are usually 
supported and trained by NGOs. According to Fouillet, Augsburg (2008), there are about 40 million 
SHG members in India. 
vi Nearly 50% of the households in our sample with RSBY membership have reported per capita 
household expenditures that are greater than the rural poverty line in the respective states. This 
could indicate either mistargeting of the RSBY scheme, or mistargeting of the BPL cards. Reports of 
mistargeting and corruption in the issuance of BPL cards are well documented in the existing 
literature (24, 28). 
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vii Ethical approval, for all data and their intended purposes for this and related studies, were 
acquired from the independent ethics committee of the University of Cologne. Informed verbal 
consent was taken prior to each interview, and respondents were free to halt the interview at any 
time, or to refuse to answer specific questions. Verbal consents were strategically sought considering 
the majority of the respondents were illiterate. After reading a statement iterating the purposes for 
the survey (in the local language), the following question was asked, the reply recorded and 
appropriate actions undertaken: “Are you willing to answer this survey?” Each of the 
aforementioned procedures were explicitly cleared by the ethics committee. 
 
viii Chronic conditions are defined as outpatient illnesses that have lasted longer than 30 days 
preceding the survey. 
ix Since respondents only report distance (in kilometres) for the providers they actually visit, we 
impute the distance to the nearest hospital for those households that have not used inpatient care 
(Borah 2006, McFadden, Train 2000, Qian et al. 2009). We estimate a log linear model on the sample 
of hospital users and subsequently predict the distance (Qian et al. 2009, Raza et al. 2013). 
Covariates used to predict the distance include household level demographic, socioeconomic and 
regional indicators.  
x We attempt to match the self-reported names of the hospitals visited to the list provided in the 
RSBY website to get an understanding of the extent of use of such empaneled hospitals, but were 
only successful in matching 20% of the used hospitals (Government of India 2014). 
xi The CBHI enrolment indicator is included as a proxy for the risk averseness of the household 
rather than to capture any substitution effects within the schemes given the RSBY coverage is 
considerably more generous and that the bulk of CBHI coverage pertains to outpatient care.  
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xii In the way it is measured, insurance related awareness may be a consequence of enrolment into an 
insurance scheme rather than a determinant. We have confirmed robustness of results to omitting 
this potentially endogenous variable, and omit this variable from model 3 (described in Section 3.2) 
as the household fixed effects should capture awareness (to the extent that it is time-invariant). 
xiii The asset tertiles includes household level characteristics such as availability of running water, 
toilet, electricity, roof material and the ratio of cement to dirt floors. The index also includes durable 
assets such as livestock, fans, radio/televisions, sewing machines, bicycles/motorcycles, mobile 
telephones and generators.    
xiv Direct costs refer to consultation fees, costs of medicine and lab/imaging tests, net of 
reimbursements from any schemes such as the CBHI. 
 
xv We prefer village over household level fixed effects because some of the more interesting 
determinants, like the SCST status do not change over time. We have checked and confirmed 
robustness of results to using household level fixed effects (see Annex Table A4). While most results 
remain consistent, some differences arise for the coefficients on the insurance awareness indices and 
distance to healthcare facilities, which is related to their limited variation over time. 
xvi As we are less interested in the coefficients on the household level covariates, we prefer using 
household fixed effects rather than village fixed effects as the former allow capturing more of the 
unobserved household level heterogeneity that may bias our coefficients on the RSBY variable. 
xvii Note this is different from difference-in-differences models in the sense that we use both 
households that enroll and drop out from one year to another as ‘treatment’ households, and those 
that are enrolled throughout or never enrolled as controls.  
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xviii Limiting the sample to those not enrolled in 2010 would not be particularly helpful in addressing 
the sample selection problem, because we do not know whether households have never enrolled, or 
have dropped out recently. 
xix Qualitative data collection suggests that around two-thirds of our sample should possess a BPL 
card. 
xx The departments heading the RSBY in Bihar (DoHFW) and in UP (DoRD) were different, 
thereby leading to line management differences in the initial implementation. Subsequently, RSBY in 
UP was implemented by DoHFW. Secondly, political governance and administration has had 
different trajectory in Bihar as compared to UP, with the latter facing scams involving National 
Rural Health Mission and its repercussions on community perceptions. In Bihar, the government 
ownership to RSBY at the district-level was relatively higher than UP. These observations were 
communicated by the field-partners and some officials engaged with the implementation of RSBY. 
xxi Lessons from the Chinese New Cooperative Medical System for example suggests the absence of 
outpatient coverage is likely to increase incidences of out-of-pocket payments and reduce impact on 
financial protection (38).  
